Today, the primary instigation and justification behind the bombs away strategy are Iran's nuclear ambitions. The primary opponents of a nuclear Iran are Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The previous focus on Iran never included nuclear weapons. The previous dual strategy on Iran offered from either side included some way of solving its human rights abuses, and cutting off its connection to Hizbollah.

Never before did we have to deal with an Iran with not just regional hegemonic ambitions, but actual likelihood of success in pursuing such ambitions (Saudi's Shia Crescent, Iraqi Shias, plus Iranian nukedom). The problem of a nuclear Iran, coupled with Israeli calls for immediate military action against the nuclear facilities (being heard by VP Cheney and the Right pundits), and a potential arms race with Saudi Arabia which in the past has struck deals with Pakistan, creates a lot of consternation. Americans, generally, deal with such consternation by reminding the world of the supremacy of their weaponry, and their ability to use said weapons.

At the current time the Right has enunciated two starkly problematic approaches to Iran. The first is the military option; something mimicking Iraq. The second is the even more idealist option in which "the Iranian people" are roused to replace their oligarchs, and in the process, magically become secular liberals (who would then somehow replace their nuclear ambitions with nuclear non-proliferation and give up their regional hegemonic dreams). Fact is, there is no reason to believe that a democratic Iran would have ambitions any lesser than an oligarchic Iran. Something more has to be done.

It is patently obvious that the first strategy is simply not viable -- insert here the multifarious logistical and military reasons for why the U.S. is not capable of any kind of sustained military campaign (a little something called Iraq and Afghanistan hinder that mission). The second option is problematic because there is no such thing as "the Iranian people." Large parts of Iranian opposition to the regime comes not from the secular elites (who for the most part are in Los Angeles and Stockholm), but from ultra-traditionalist Ayatollahs like Bourojourdi who happen to disagree with the regime on theological grounds (as they believe that the Iranian state was not meant to become co-extensive with the idea of the Mahdi). The Right never asks how it will transform a society of 60+ million into one secular liberal monolith; and upon realizing that it has no meaningful answer to this conundrum, it consents to a discourse that is largely rooted in the use of arms (which some think should be total and some say surgical). None of these solutions are viable and I believe the Left can do better.

Here then are the points that the Left needs to establish:

1 - Containing Iran's nuclear weapons and regional hegemonic ambitions cannot be done by relying upon (or subverting) the "Iranian People." Instead, the means to be used have to be diplomatic and economic and have to take place amongst the leadership. This will, ultimately, require the President of the United States to meet with the President of Iran. There will be objections for such a meeting because the White House will not want to "stoop" to a poseur like Ahmedinejad nor to affirm a holocaust denier. Unfortunately, containing nuclear bombs aimed at Tel Aviv (and a hot arms race with Saudi Arabia and potentially even Turkey) is far more important than pride or punishing bigotry. Until this meeting takes place the United States has to hope that someone like Rafsanjani can become the face of Iran as it would immediately solve the problem of how to sit down with an Iranian leader.

2 -  The Iranian civil society can be, and must be, given a "Polish push." That is to say, American money, both through NGO's and through satellite radio and TV, has to find its way into Iranian civil society. However, at the current time, the largest reason that democracy promotion has failed in Iran has not to do with the fact that there are not many Iranian democrats, but because of the simple fact that the United States does not maintain diplomatic ties with Iran. The Athenian model of democracy promotion demonstrates that foreign states do not adopt democracy unless interchange from the dominant democrat is available. In short, the United States has to ressurect Khatami's "Dialogue of Civilizations" while affirming to themselves that this is really a one way street where American democracy gets exported. Here, the American experience in developing democracy in Latin America is instructive. The only places in Latin America where we successfully cultivated democracy were those where we opened up diplomatic ties with the nation. Where we did not (Cuba), the country did not democratize (no matter how many native democrats and defectors).

Ultimately, point number two means that we cannot punish the Iranian leadership by imposing sanctions on the population. Only trade will do.

3 - Assuming diplomatic ties can be opened we Americans have to be willing to couch our advances in two overlapping but distinct forms: a) Islamic Iran b) ethnic Persian Iran. Not all Iranians respond to appeals to their Persian heritage; many of them (which includes many of the poor), respond most favorably when their religion is involved in some capacity. As such, it will not be enough merely to celebrate "Persian heritage" and "Persian culture." Often, under the guidance of the Los Angeles and Stockholm Iranians -- who have their  own agendas and class persuasions -- Americans speak to Iranians in such a-theological approaches. That is not OK. We have to become cognizant that the approach has to be dual: we must talk about the ancient Persian kings, yes, but also of Imam Hussain and the Mahdi. Fortunately, there exist a vast amount of theologically minded Iranians in the West who would be more than willing (flatterd in fact) to assist in this venture.

4 - The U.S. has to de-escalate the war of words between Iran and Israel. Unfortunately the only half of this equation that the US can control is the Israeli side. It is difficult for the Jewish state to sit silently as Iranian firebrands talk about wiping it off the map and hold anti-holocaust conferences. The only way the US can protect the Israelis here, we must realize, is if we take the lead in talking to the Iranians and encouraging them to give up such rhetoric (all the while asking the Israelis to be just a little more patient).

Incidentally, it isn't the war of words that is the problem between Iran and Israel; a certain little group called Hizbollah poses a huge problem for how successfully we can deal with the Israel/Iran tug of war. Hizbollah, however, has a weak spot; namely, Syria. Which leads to point 5.

5 - The US has two options in "turning" Syria. One is to do it outright by convincing Assad to switch allegiances. The other is the more promising approach and that is to let Turkey place greater pressure on Syria both militarily and culturally. There is vast evidence of the fact that Turkey looks to Syria as part of its own regional plans and has started to rely on Syrian labor in its own economic expansion. Inturning Turkey towards Syria, the best thing to happen would be if Turkey did not enter the EU (so perhaps the US should consider lobbying against Turkey in Brussels).

Caveat: I have left out any mention of Iraq and how to involve Iran in that discussion because that ought to be part of the Iraq narrative.

Part I is available here.