We can conclude that the politicization of American universities is complete when everyone from Barrack Obama, a popular candidate for President, and Jihadwatch, a blog on the fringes of American conservatism, both feel the need to dive into our intellectual sanctuaries to peddle their opinions. As a matter of policy, politicians and pundits should abstain from entering the academcy unless they are invited.

Recently, Jihadwatch writer Robert Spencer submitted an op-ed full of glaring errors to the Emory Wheel, Emory University's Student Paper. The central premise of this op-ed (which is a shortened version of his earlier post), was this:

Unfortunately, however, jihad as warfare against non-believers in order to institute "Sharia" worldwide is not propaganda or ignorance, or a heretical doctrine held by a tiny minority of extremists. Instead, it is a constant element of mainstream Islamic theology.

The article then quotes various legal scholars from Islamic history that purportedly support the thesis of the article. It then, generously, concludes with challenging a college student to a debate.

Immediately one has to look at the most obvious of errors in this piece.

First, none of the scholars Spencer cites to were alive after the year 1406 A.D. The only link he offers between the past and today is the assertion that one of the jurists, Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328), is a "favorite of Osama bin Laden and other jihadists." Yet, on the basis of the fact that one jurist, from more than 600 years ago, is the "favorite" of Bin Laden, Spencer derives his conclusion that Jihad is a "constant" element of "mainstream Islamic theology." One scholar. 600 years removed. One Bin Laden. Can a reasonable person really believe that such a link proves something about "mainstream Islamic theology"? One doesn't have to attend Emory University to be able to answer that.

The next problem is the very use of the term "Islamic Theology." Spencer seems to believe that when he quotes from "jurisprudence" he is automatically speaking about "theology." We see this when he says:

Instead, it is a constant element of mainstream Islamic theology. It is affirmed by all four principal schools of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence. 

I'm afraid to inform the distinguished New York Times bestselling author on Islam that Islamic Theology is very distinct from Islamic Jurisprudence. Islamic Theology is an altogether different discipline encompassing metaphysics, philosophy and eschatology. It is called Kalam. (One would be well advised to read Profesor Wolfson's Philosophy of the Kalam in order to see how distinct Islamic Jurisprudence truly is from Islamic Theology). Kalam is speculative philosophy which produces theological precepts. Islamic Jurisprudence, as with all jurisprudence, on the other hand, deals with actual legal problems. The word for Islamic Jurisprudence is fiqh. I am very interested in learning how Kalam and Fiqh became one and the same.

This leads me to some other other problems with the article.

Islam is, like Judaism (and unlike Christianity which is what Spencer practices), a juridical religion. The Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet, both contain conflicting verses and narrations. In order to fashion a means of reconciling these conflicts with the changing nature of human life, the earliest members of Muslim community devised a methodological system of law or jurisprudence (fiqh). Spencer is, unlike the average blog troll, actually aware of the juridical nature of Islam, and as such, a dialogue with him is not only possible, but refreshing. He recognizes that the best way of enunciating Islamic Law is to quote Islamic Jurists. For that much, he should be applauded.

However, the problem arises when Spencer then tries to convince everyone from his readers to Muslims themselves, that the only authentic jurists (or most popular jurists) are those from the past from whom he pulls his quotes. Certainly, people like Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Khaldun were authentic jurists in Islam. Unfortunately, what Spencer doesn't recognize is the fundamental problem of jurisprudence, whether its Islamic or secular: jurists are bound by their context; the world around them. 

One has only to think of American Jurisprudence. At one point in time, American Jurists like John C. Calhoun argued that "slavery was a positive good" (on the Senate floor no less). Even the founding fathers, jurists the likes of which very few have ever existed, held that a black man was, under the law, only worth 3/5th of a white man (and women were worth nothing). Does this mean that "bigotry is a constant element of American law?" Any reasonable person would conclude no. As such, any reasonable person should also be able to conclude that the world prior to 1406 -- when a Christian Europe and an Islamic Africa/Asia were at war, is a very different world than the post WWII, UN regulated world. The rulings of those jurists -- and a jurist is just a fallible lawyer -- in the past about their politics means no more to me than the jurisprudence of John C. Calhoun on race relations. It isn't just in race relations that American Jurisprudence has changed. Until 1986, the legislators in the state of New York allowed a 15 year old girl to be married. This law was changed when jurists came along and revised their opinion and made it 18. 

So, how do we know that most Muslim people do not, and are not, listening to the edicts of jurists from 600 years ago? Well, most Muslim nations are not at war with non-Muslim nations, and where there are tensions these are not on the basis of anyone's religiosity (most are land disputes). The only "Muslim" parties today who engage in killing on the basis of someone being non-Muslim are jihadists; not the "mainstream of Islamic theology." For the most part, jihadists are prosecuted as criminals all around the Muslim world (the Pakistani military has lost close to 2000 men in hunting Al-Qaeda), and jihadist methods and approaches are rejectedby Muslims universally; not to mention giving rise to anti-jihadist fatwas.

In fact, one will see that Spencer's article cites to a jurist from the Maliki school of law (Khaldun), yet if one compares Khaldun (d. 1406) with this jurist alive today from the Maliki school, we immediately see how the jurist today conceptualize war (very differently from the past). Here is another example, this jurist being a student of scholars trained at al-Azhar university, and concludes this about violence:

A. Taking the law into one's own hands amounts to either Fasad fi'l-Ard (creating disorder) or Muharabah (rebellion) -- both of which are punishable by death in Islam.

B. The Prophet's saying (sws) usually cited to give credence to the idea that Islam allows an individual or a group the use of force to end wrong is actually related to the use of power within the confines of the social and legal authority.

C. In Islam, there is no concept of Jihad (Qital to be more precise -- that is militant struggle in the way of Allah) or the implementation of punishments without the authority of the State.

I therefore want to thank Spencer for providing an opportunity to demonstrate to Muslims and non-Muslims alike that in Islam, changed conditions bring about changes in law. American Law with respect to racism and gender underwent reformation. Islamic Law with respect to violence against non-Muslims has also modified to fit with the world in which it finds itself. 

I completely accept the usual rejoinder from critics that there are many areas of Islamic Law where today's jurists have simply accepted the opinions of jurists from the past (and done injustice). This includes women's rights, minority rights, and the issue of apostasy, among others. However, as time passes, more and more Muslim jurists are making up their own minds about these issues. I'm not even a jurist and I am doing my own thinking about these matters.

Sheikh Ali Gomaa, the high Mufti of Egypt, whom Spencer in another post tries to paint as an extremist because Gomaa (like John Ashcroft) does not allow graven images in statues, recently allowed women to get hymen reconstruction surgery, as well as allowing women the right to political leadership. Other major jurists today have allowed women the right to lead prayer. Even al-Azhar University, by no means a bastion of reform, has taken a strong stance against Female Genital Mutilation which it once used to permit. Islamic Law changes. I hope that is obvious by now. The way islamic jurisprudence evolved to make rules limiting violence serves as a model of how islamic jurisprudence will evolve to give rights to women, minorities and non-Muslims. I wish that Spencer would recognize this and leave Muslim reformists from having to correct his errors.

In conclusion, jihadists, whom Spencer tries to link to the Islamic schools of law are actually deniers of Islamic legal methodology, preferring to circumvent Islamic Law altogether. This actually confirms a point I've made previously; namely, the problem within Islam is a problem of intellectual anarchy which I provide one way of how to address.

And this problem is not alleviated when a group claiming to watch the jihadis is looking in all the wrong places.

I want to thank Emory students Sharefa Aria, Ridwan Khan, Huma Mirza and Aneel Naeem who articulated their response to Spencer. I also want to bid kudos to Emory sudent Ammara Abbasi for writing this wonderful article on the moral and ethical principles that underlie the spiritual jihad. While I am heartened to see American students articulate their disagreements in such a positive manner, it is somewhat problematic that young adults who should be studying for their mid terms and enjoying going to parties are put in the absurd position of having to defend their faith from someone outside the academy who already have careers writing about Islam.